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By Steve Balk
I. Introduction
{1}
Imagine yourself waiting interminable hours to board your international
flight to Europe. The wait is due to the increased security measures
due to the threat of terrorism, but still you are uneasy that
even these new security measures will not be enough to deter potential
terrorists. In addition, the time spent in line is wasted time,
during which you cannot be productive to your business.
{2}
You, the traveler, must balance the increased time and cost of
traveling against the necessity of travel. If you found that there
was a different, lower security airline on which you could travel
more cheaply, would you choose the cheaper alternative and risk
your security? Possibly you the traveler will choose to abstain
entirely from traveling, instead using the ever-more sophisticated
forms of communication to complete your business work. The analysis
of which choice consumers will make as a whole, and the effect
on the airlines and government, is a subject this Note will examine
using the discipline of law and economics.
{3}
This Note will discuss, using the discipline of law and economics
as a framework, various proposals for increasing the safety of
airline travel.1 The Note will examine, in turn, the
workings of each form of enhanced security and then will discuss
the application of law and economics analysis to the proposed
security improvements.2 Finally, this Note will draw
conclusions about the economic ramifications of the improvements.3
II. Law and Economics
A. Supply and Demand
{4}
The theory of law and economics encompasses a vast array of real
world topics. "[E]conomics is the science of rational choice
in the world--our world--in which resources are limited in relation
to human wants."4 The scarcity of resources is
a given in economics, and federal funding for any project is a
resource.
{5}
The discipline assumes that "man is a rational maximizer
of his ends in life, his satisfactions--what we shall call his
'self-interest.'"5 This behavior need not rise
to the level of conscious choice, for the behavior may be unconscious
or assumed to be chosen.6 Finally, self-interest should
not be confused with selfishness, for the interests of other people
may well be a part of one's own self-interest.7 Having
summarized the discipline's view of man, it is necessary to turn
to the fundamental principles of economics.
{6}
The first principle is known as the Law of Demand.8
When the price of a good rises relative to other goods, a rational
consumer will look to substitute less preferred goods that are
now more inexpensive. Many consumers will prefer the good, even
at its raised price, but others will substitute other goods which
are cheaper. As a result, the total quantity demanded by consumers
will decrease:
{7}
Dollars are shown on the vertical axis, increasing upward. The
units demanded are shown on the horizontal axis, increasing to
the right. A rise in price from p1 to p2 results in a reduction
in the quantity demanded, from q1 to q2. Inversely, when quantity
supplied falls, the effect is to raise the price.9
1. The Law of Demand
{8}
The Law of Demand is not limited in applicability to goods with
explicit prices.10 "Unpopular teachers sometimes
try to increase class enrollment by raising the average grade
of the students in their classes; for, other things being equal,
hard graders have smaller class enrollments than easy graders."11
These types of nonpecuniary prices, or prices which are not measured
in money, are called "shadow prices" by economists.12
{9}
A second law is that consumers are assumed to be trying to maximize
their utility, which may be interpreted as happiness, profit,
or pleasure.13 When sellers or buyers of goods with
a pecuniary price are involved, it is customary to speak of "profit
maximization" rather than utility maximization.14
Sellers seek to maximize the difference between their sales costs
and revenues, but for the moment, one must consider the lowest
price that a seller for which he would be willing to part with
his goods. The minimum is the "price that the resources consumed
in making the seller's product would command in their next best
use," that is an alternate use for which the seller could
achieve a profit.15 A corollary of the notion of alternative
price is that the cost may only be incurred when someone else
is denied use of the resource.16
2. Price and Cost
{10}
An "opportunity cost" to the economist is the cost of
using a good in such a way that the benefit of an alternative
use is denied to another.17 Economics is really about
resources, "with money merely being a claim on those resources."18
The economist must distinguish between transfers that affect the
use of resources, which is where the rights to use a scarce resource
change hands, and the transactions in which merely money changes
hands, called transfer payments.19 A transfer of purely
money may diminish the purchase power of one, but it should increase
the purchase power of another by an equal amount.20
"Put differently, it would be a private cost, but not a social
one. A social cost diminishes the wealth of society, a private
cost merely rearranges the wealth."21 Those who
wish to maximize the aggregate wealth of society are thus unconcerned
with private costs, for any income distribution should contain
the same amount of wealth, however social costs must be minimized
thereby maximizing society's wealth.
{11}
The forces of competition tend to make opportunity cost the maximum
as well as the minimum price for a given good.22 "A
price above opportunity cost is a magnet drawing resources into
the production of the good until the increase in output drives
price, by the Law of Demand, down to the level of cost."23
Equilibrium means a stable point, and the equilibrium occurs when
the amount supplied and demanded are equal, due to similar prices
demanded and payable. At equilibrium, there is no incentive for
sellers to alter price or output.24
B. Government Regulation
{12}
If some arbitrary limit is imposed on the market, the natural
equilibrium will be disturbed, and a new equilibrium will be established,
albeit one that will not reflect true opportunity costs. For example,
suppose that the government imposed a price ceiling, a cap of
cost below the equilibrium price:
{13}
As a result of the market intervention, P will now intersect the
supply curve to the left of the demand curve, meaning that supply
will fall short of demand.25 Equilibrium will eventually
be reestablished, whether it be through waiting periods for the
goods, or a black market in the regulated good.26 In
establishing market controls, governments may not always be entirely
rational actors.27
C. The Free Market and the Rational Actor
{14}
The third basic principle of economics is that resources tend
to gravitate toward their most valuable uses if voluntary exchange
is permitted.28 In a free market, both parties enter
into the exchange because each feels he is receiving more for
his property than it is worth, otherwise the exchange would not
occur.29 By a process of voluntary exchange, resources
are shifted to those uses in which the highest value to consumers,
as measured by their willingness to pay, is achieved.30
Resources are said to be employed efficiently when their value
is highest.31 A rational actor may also place a price
on life.32 With this background in economics, this
Note will now turn to a description of several proposed security
measures.
III. A History of Airline Safety Regulation
{15}
In 1956, following public outcry to regulate flying safety after
a crash between United and TWA flights over the Grand Canyon cost
the lives of 128 people, Congress created the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).33 The FAA was given the task
of regulating air traffic control and airline safety.34
Recently, events have caused this agency to issue recommendations
for improved airline safety.35
A. The Beginning of the Need
{16}
The airline industry was largely unregulated with regard to physical
security, until the early 1970's.36 During its lifetime,
the airline industry has greatly expanded, and this trend will
continue.37 There are now 20,000 scheduled flights
each day in the United States.38 The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) predicts 2.1 million domestic passengers
per day by the year 2007, up from the current 1.5 million.39
This growing number of passengers in the same amount of airspace
must lead to larger planes, thus a greater cost for each airline
crash or sabotage.40
{17}
The recent disasters involving ValuJet and Trans World Airlines
have prompted heightened scrutiny and calls for more regulation
or at least increased spending on safety.41 However,
there are limits to the security which finite amounts of money
may purchase. "When you're dealing with the highly innovative
malevolence of humans," there is no dollar amount that will
buy complete safety.42 Complete safety is not economically
efficient, and therefore not desirable.43
B. Reactions to Terrorism
{18}
On September 10, 1996, President Clinton asked Congress to authorize
more than $1 billion in new spending to counteract threats against
the American public.44 His proposal would "commit
the government in the short term to expanding markedly its financial
and operational role in assuring airline security in the name
of overall national security."45 However, the
plan assumes that airlines will eventually pick up the bulk of
the security costs. The administration said that over time the
commercial airline industry would be expected to bear a significant
fraction of the costs, perhaps running to billions of dollars.46
{19}
The proposal includes "immediate background security checks
for workers with access to secure areas, [and] starting a test
program to match each piece of luggage with its passenger on all
domestic flights...."47 Among other areas of emphasis,
this proposal would also increase "profiling" of passengers.48
Profiling involves assessing the probabilities of certain suspects
to act in certain manners.
{20}
In addition to the three areas of proposed regulation, this Note
will also examine the proposed use of "sniffers" to
detect the presence of plastic explosives. The bombing of Pan
Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 helped to raise
public awareness of plastic explosives.49 However the
current system of x-raying baggage is vulnerable to plastic explosives,
which will not register on a metal detector and are difficult
to detect X-ray machines.50 The proposed new system
for detecting plastic explosives utilizes the "medical CT-scan
technology."51
{21}
Finally, the FAA and various outside safety experts have called
for the airlines and airports to attract better personnel to man
the security systems. Most security personnel can be considered
low-skilled.52 However, the cost of training and maintaining
this army is considered high by the airports and airlines.
1. Security Background Checks on Employees
{22}
Under the President's recommendations, discussed by his new Aviation
Safety and Security Commission, employees with access to secured
areas would be subject to criminal background investigations.53
This measure would subject airline and airport employees to the
same checks as for example, day-care providers have.54
However, this proposal is limited to workers; there is yet no
attempt to broaden background checks to passengers.
2. Luggage Matching
{23}
The proposal to match luggage utilizes experimental technology.55
Micron Communications, Inc. is one leading company in the fast
growing field of security technology.56 However, even
Micron's security products remain generally untested under field
conditions.57
{24}
The proposed system would encode computer chips with information
about travelers, including their name, destination, flight number,
and originating airport.58 The airlines would place
an identical chip in the tag accompanying each piece of baggage.59
Upon boarding, the passengers and their luggage would be matched
using radio technology.60 If a suitcase or other piece
of baggage is found on the plane without an accompanying passenger,
the luggage would be quickly removed and inspected.
3. Increased Profiling
{25}
Profiling involves the use of data to form a picture of a suspicious
passenger; one who fits at least some of the characteristics of
a terrorist.61 The names, addresses, phone numbers,
travel histories and billing records of passengers would be run
through a database, controlled by a federal government agency,
that might lead to a search of luggage of those deemed suspicious.62
This necessarily raises privacy concerns.63 Previously,
no national system had existed; the airport security agencies
operated alone.64
4. Plastic Explosives Detection
{26}
In 1990, Congress mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration
develop new technology to detect plastic explosives.65
InVision Technologies, a California company has become the only
company to achieve FAA certification for a plastic-bomb detection
system.66 Despite the limitations of metal detectors
and x-ray machines, they are some airports' only line of inadequate
defense against plastic explosives. InVision's CTX machine, however,
can detect "tiny amounts of plastic explosive."67
Unfortunately, the machines cost about $1 million apiece and have
a low capacity in terms of bags being slowly processed.68
5. Increased Wages and Training for Security Personnel
{27}
People must operate the security machines. No matter how sophisticated
the machine, somebody has to sit by the machine and make a decision.69
The more sophisticated the machine, the better the capability
needed to operate it."
{28}
Unfortunately, these types of jobs are often considered "dead-end"
or low prestige positions. This means that these positions are
unlikely to attract the more intelligent and motivated kinds of
people necessary for good security work. An increase in pay and
training might remedy some of these deficiencies.
IV. An Economic Analysis of the Proposed Regulations
{29}
An in-depth cost and benefit analysis of all the proposals is
impossible at this time. The proposals are just that, and their
effectiveness cannot yet be judged. However, the merits of each
individual idea may be subjected to a law and economics analysis,
that is to an understanding of the costs and benefits involved,
even without an exact dollar amount.
A. Generally
{30}
All the costs of these proposed measures must be borne by some
party, the airlines (and thus airline passengers), airline passengers
directly, or the government (and thus taxpayers). If the passengers
are directly affected, say by a change in the ticket price or
increased waiting time, this will change the price from p1 to
p2 and thus lessen demand for airline service from d1 to d2.70
On the other hand, if the cost is borne by the government and
the taxpayers, little change in demand is likely. The payment
is made by a larger population and in a method by which the taxpayer
does not notice the higher price for the product.
1. Security Background Checks on Employees
{31}
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of "unreasonable
searches and seizures."71 However, barring other
contractual or legal restrictions, there seems little limit on
the background checks that an employer may perform on an employee.
The President has proposed increased background checks on employees
as a means of deterring further terrorism.72 That measure's
effectiveness may be limited according to a law and economics
analysis.
{32}
Assume a hypothetical airline has instituted a complete background
check in accordance with the President's recommendations. Further,
this check obviously may only determine what actions the employee
has taken in the past. If an employee is judged suspect, he will
not be hired. What will the practical effect be on a terrorist?
{33}
These measures will increase the cost of an employee being the
responsible party for planting a bomb or committing some form
of terrorist attack. A theoretically thorough background check
would determine which employees would have terrorist connections,
so any help from an employee would have to be gained after the
employee was hired. This would force the terrorist to expend resources
on recruitment of airline employees, possibly resulting in a change
of attack methods.73 A terrorist may decide that another
method of attack would result in less risk, or have a lower cost.
Thus instituting background checks will lead an economically rational
terrorist to target another airline.
{34}
Viewing the problems from the airlines' perspective, a complete
background check may force a higher wage for airline employees.74
If the pool of possible airline employees is limited, any attempt
to shrink the pool would result in a smaller supply of employees,
and thus a larger relative demand for those employees which remain
qualified. As shown above, this will result in a higher price
(wage) being paid for each employee.75
{35}
Finally, under a law and economics analysis, any employee who
survives the background check will be in a better position than
he would have been had there been no checks at all.76
Because the pool is limited, any reductions will result in an
increased wage for the employee.77 This is based on
an unrealistic assumption of a fixed labor pool.78
{36}
The security measure of completing background checks on employees
will likely increase the costs to terrorists of using airline
employees in their attacks, leading to the choice of a different
means of attack. Employees who pass the test will benefit to an
extent. Airlines will pay higher prices for workers, so the cost
must be borne by the government or passengers.
2. Luggage Matching
{37}
Luggage matching, as explained above, forces the airlines to ensure
that the passenger matched with the bag boards the plane before
his luggage is set aboard.79 The drawbacks of this
system include increased cost and delay. As a benefit, if the
system works as intended, it should stop all non-suicidal terrorists
from planting bombs in their luggage.
{38}
An analysis of this system, assuming only the waiting time is
varied, must determine if this measure should be mandated or if
the airlines should be given free rein to implement it as they
see fit. Of all the proposed measures, the one with the most dramatic
impact is luggage matching, because it will affect all passengers.80
If the plan is fully implemented, airlines would have to match
millions of bags each day, an error regarding any one of which
could cause hours of delays.81
{39}
A simpler solution would allow the airlines to match the bags
as they saw fit.82 Given that a change of plan or a
mistake by any passenger might delay the flight, consumers may
soon wish they could choose whether to accept the costs of the
inevitable delays.83 Consumers could also gauge the
impact of the safety measures on their perceived safety by weighing
the costs and benefits using the Hand Formula.84
{40}
Consumer have indicated they prefer to do without the frills on
domestic flights. Note the rapid expansion of discount carriers
such as Southwest Air at the expense of the mainstream, more expensive
airlines. The only variable is the price consumers are willing
to pay for the increased safety offered by luggage matching.85
{41}
From the airlines' point of view, luggage matching produces many
costs. Because one passenger may negligently delay a flight, causing
money to be spent as the plane waits on the runway, airlines will
likely spend much money on advertising the system, hoping to change
consumer behavior.86 An airline which unilaterally
implemented luggage matching may gain some passengers, but its
expenses would rise dramatically without similarly increased revenue.
For this reason, airlines are likely to wish for a government
mandate which would make the system mandatory, so that no competitor
could cut costs by refusing to implement the luggage matching
system.
3. Increased Profiling
{42}
Perhaps no part of the proposed regulations has been criticized
as much as the proposal which calls for increased profiling of
passengers.87 Profiling is commonplace in the search
for drugs, although it has not gone unchallenged in the courts.88
The purpose of the profiling proposed here is merely to narrow
the number of bags which airline employees must intensely scrutinize.89
This profiling would reduce the amount of money needed for the
purchase of bomb detection equipment.
{43}
A law and economic analysis of the searches may use the Hand Formula
to determine to what extent the searches need be regulated.90
Another criticism of profiling is that the profiles may be skewed
toward certain racial or ethnic groups.91 Support has
also been forthcoming for the proposal from travel groups.92
{44}
Under a law and economic approach, the alleged discrimination
in the profiles may be justified. If hypothetically the profiles
omitted certain likely racial groups, the benefits of this decision
would accrue only to the affected minority, but the costs would
be borne by the majority and also the minority.93 Another
factor is the cost of information. To the extent that some attribute
is correlated with the existence of a certain characteristic,
it is rational for people to use the visible attribute as a proxy
for information about the more expensive to discover characteristic.94
Thus, it would be economically efficient to discriminate against
a certain class of people who are likely to be criminals since
determining if each individual in the group is a criminal would
be much more expensive.
{45}
Even discriminatory profiling may be justified because the costs
of obtaining individual information is much greater than the costs
imposed by searches based on a profile. While no one will object
to stopping terrorism, many may object to a discriminatory profiling
system. Both moral and constitutional objections may be raised.
However, constitutional law is beyond the scope of this note--the
practice is economically efficient.
4. Plastic Explosives Detection
{46}
The analysis of explosives detection is rather simple. If the
cost of implementing the system is less than the benefits of the
system, airports should purchase the detection equipment.95
X-ray detection technology is already in widespread use in the
nation's airports, with little complaint from passengers.
{47}
This is likely to be a hidden cost, as the federal government
pays for the initial equipment, with the airports taking over
the operation in the long term.96 A better method would
be to include a security surcharge on each ticket, allowing consumers
to appreciate the true costs of safety. Under the plan by which
general revenue funds would pay for the equipment, the benefits
are spread to those who use the airlines, while the cost is borne
by all. This may lead to a misallocation of resources, as no one
directly pays for the security, so no market can be established
as to how much security the public desires. This situation may
call for the government to act to combat allocative inefficiencies.
5. Increased Wages and Training for Security Personnel
{48}
The personnel who are directly responsible for passenger security--those
who screen the luggage--are often poorly motivated and compensated.
A recent FAA study noted widespread problems with security personnel
training.97 Under the Federal Aviation Act, airlines
are responsible for screening passengers and luggage.98
This often results in airlines contracting out this service to
the lowest bidder, which results in low-paid employees.99
{49}
Upgrading employee training and compensation will result in increased
costs for travelers. Barring a government takeover of airport
security, the airlines must improve security at their own expense.100
As costs increase, demand will decrease, unless more passengers
are willing to travel due to the apparent increased safety.101
B. Possible Secondary Effects
{50}
As more money is spent on preventative measures, terrorists will
presumably spend more time and money to overcome these countermeasures,
an example of rent-seeking. However, terrorists may also move
their attacks to other forms of transportation or structures.
As the Vice President acknowledged, "There is no silver bullet.
We're facing new challenges, and we have to come up with new responses."102
The costs of air travel and the time involved will certainly increase.
Travelers may choose to travel less by air given the worries that
accompany this mode of travel. However, even economists may be
uncertain as to the effects of certain measures.103
V. Conclusion
{51}
Terrorists have forced consumers everywhere to pay more for security
and countermeasures, not to mention lost opportunities. While
few would dispute the need for increased security, there may be
more efficient methods of delivering the same product--a safe
airline trip. Security background checks on employees may be justified
economically, but continued vigilance over employee contacts is
prohibitively expensive. Luggage matching will deter at least
one form of attack, but will certainly result in great costs in
time and effort. Increased passenger profiling can be justified
on its general effectiveness, despite those who question its fairness.
Greater explosives detection should be implemented if the cost
of the machines is less than the benefit they produce. Finally,
increased wages and training will certainly result in increased
effectiveness for airline security personnel, but the consumer
may not be willing to pay the price. As the war on terrorism continues,
America needs to implement tighter security measures, but these
measures should not be adopted without analysis of the costs and
benefits involved.
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1. See infra part III.B.
2. See infra part IV.A.
3. See infra part IV.B.
4. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3 (4th ed.
1992). Posner is known as a member of the Chicago school of law
and economics, the leading school of thought for law and economics
theory. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Reconstructing the Sherman Act
of 1890: Law, Economics, and the Ethic of Industry and Restraint,
__.
5. Id. In a related footnote, Posner writes, "Throughout
this book, the 'masculine' pronouns are used in a generic rather
than a gendered sense." Id. at 2. This author will
follow the same convention.
4. Id. at 4. This point may well provoke debate, that while
an actor may choose to act in his own self-interest, he is not
consciously choosing to do so. However, that philosophical question
is beyond the scope of this Note. For a different perspective,
see Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between
Economics and Psychology, 99 J. Pol. Econ 877 (1991).
5. Posner, supra note 4, at 4.
6. Id.
7. Id. Posner further notes that this analysis assumes
that the only change occurring in the system is the change in
relative price or in quantity. Posner, supra note
4, at 4. Yet if, for example, demand were increasing at the same
time that the price was rising, the quantity demanded might not
fall; it may even rise. Id.
This analysis also assumes away the possible impact of a change
in relative price on incomes. Such a change might have a feedback
effect on the quantity demanded. Id. at 4, 5. This may
be ignored, for the feedback effects of a change in price of a
single item are usually quite minimal. Id. at
5.
8. Id.
9. Posner, supra note 4, at 6
10. Id.
11. Id. Others have argued that laws generally should reflect
a societal desire for the maximization of wealth. See Robert
H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 Colum.
L. Rev. 401 (1965).
12. Posner, supra note 4, at 6.
13. Id. Of course, if no alternate use exists, the price
of the original product may be driven to zero. However, costs
of a product must include labor, so that a product which could
only be sold for nothing would not be produced, so the seller
would still have the use of his time.
14. Id. Posner uses the illustration of breathing air.
Because he may breathe as much air as he wants without depriving
anyone else of the right to breathe as much air as the third party
wants, no one will pay him to breathe less air. Id.
15. Id. Posner utilizes the following illustrations:
The major cost of higher education is the foregone earnings that
one would have earned if he were working rather than attending
school. Those earnings may well exceed the cost of college. Also,
supposing that a barrel of oil sells for only two dollars, but
in ten years it will sell for 20 dollars, the "producer who
holds on to his oil for the" future realizes the two dollars
of lost profit now as an opportunity cost. Posner, supra
note 4, at 4.
16. Id.
17. Id. Posner notes that:
Housework is an economic activity, even if the
houseworker is a spouse who does not receive
pecuniary compensation; it involves cost-
primarily the opportunity cost of the
houseworker's time.... In contrast, the transfer
by taxation from me to a poor (or to a rich)
person would be costless in itself; regardless
of its effects on his and my incentives.... It
would not diminish my stock of resources.
Id.
18. Of course, this assumes that transfer costs are negligible,
an assumption utilized throughout this Note.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Posner, supra note 4, at 8.
21. Id. Competition will not drive price below opportunity
cost, for then no rational seller will produce the product but
will instead divert his resources and time to the production and
sale of alternate goods. This will result in fewer goods being
available and a higher price for those goods.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 10. As to how the equilibrium will be reestablished,
Posner notes:
The reason is that the lower price simultaneously
reduces the incentives of producers to make the
good and increases the desire of consumers to buy
it. The result is a shortage. How is equilibrium
restored? By using a nonprice method of allocating
supply to demand.
Id.
25. See Philip Jones & John Cullis, Legitimate and
Illegitimate Transfers: Dealing with "Political" Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 247 (1996)
in which the authors note that governments often may consider
the self-interest of the government or its employees, and not
just the interest of the public, when making cost-benefit calculations.
Id. at 254.
26. Posner, supra note 4, at 10. This is not to
imply that a resource's most valuable use is necessarily its best
use morally, just economically. Some advocates of this school
have argues that all common law is an application of law and economics,
existing to maximize the aggregation of wealth. See Wetlaufer,
supra note 1, at 7. A non-critical application law and
economics may lead to so-called "moral monstrosities."
For familial law and economics, see Michael J. Trebilock
& Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in Family
Law: A Law and economic Perspective, 41 U. Toronto L. J.
533 (1991).
27. Posner, supra note 4, at 10. A rational actor
may have emotional value attached to some property which would
prohibit its transfer. For example, I might value an object for
sentimental reasons and refuse to sell it at a objective fair
market value. However, the market has functioned, for I have more
highly valued the object than the price offered. Objectively,
I am worse off, but subjectively, I have gained.
28. Id. at 11. Value may only be measured by the ability
and willingness to pay. Without an ability to pay, the resource
will not be transferred, and without a willingness to pay, there
will be no voluntary transaction.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Mark A. Glick, The Law and Economics of Tort Damages,
9 Utah Bar J. 8 (1996). Economists use two methods to determine
what a life is worth: market statistical studies (if a worker
faces a 1/1000 increased chance of death at his job and is willing
to work for $1000 above a normal job, he values his life at $1,000,000)
and contingent valuation surveys (asking each worker how much
he would pay to avoid injury or death). Id.
31. Douglas Feaver, A New Route to Safety; The Airline Industry
has Changed: So Must the FAA, The Wash. Post, Aug.
4, 1996, at A2.
32. Id.
33. See generally, Laurie M. McQuade, Note and Comment,
Tragedy as a Catalyst for Reform: The American Way?, 11 Conn.
J. Int'l L. 325 (1996).
34. Shirlyce Mannning, Comment, The United States' Response
to International Air Safety, 61 J. Air L. & Com.
505, 514 (1996). This was due in part to the absence of terrorist
threat and to the need for the FAA to work to prevent accidents.
If commercial airliners crashed at the same rate as they did in
the 1960s, there would be a crash every 10 days. Feaver, supra
note 30, at A8.
35. Id. For example, although the airlines of Braniff,
Eastern, and Pan Am have all failed since the deregulation of
the 1970s, the number of passengers on boarding U.S. aircraft
rose from 302.8 million in 1980 to 540.2 million in 1994. Id.
Over that same period, the average domestic fare has fallen, in
1996 dollars, from $158 to $107. Id. Domestic passenger
miles traveled during that same period rose 37% for airlines and
only 37% for cars. Id.
36. Feaver, supra note 33, at A2.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Robert Davis, TWA Crash May Forever be a Mystery, Reno
Says, USA Today, Sept. 23, 1996, at 3A. However, the
cause of the TWA crash has not yet been established. "Attorney
General Janet Reno acknowledged Sunday that officials may never
know what felled the plane." Id.; see also
Brian Michael Jenkins, The Crash of TWA Flight 800, San
Diego Union Trib., Sept. 15, 1996, at G1 (quoting a member
of the President's commission on airline safety as stating "The
biggest threat we face is keeping bombs off airliners.").
40. Feaver, supra note 33, at A1.
41. Posner, supra note 4, at 163.
42. Todd S. Purdum, $1 Billion Sought for Anti-terrorism Plan,
Austin American-Statesman, Aug. 4, 1996, at A1.
43. Id.; see generally, Manning, supra
note 36.
44. Purdam, supra note 44, at A1. In the past, airlines
and airports have largely handled airport security. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. This proposal has "raised the hackles of civil
liberties groups concerned about privacy violations, and [Vice
President Al] Gore has ordered the creation of an advisory group
of authorities in to consul on the development of the 'profiling'
system to insure it does not violate privacy rights." Id.
47. Charles Boisseau, Improvements Needed to Combat Airline
Safety Threat, Houston Chron., Aug. 4, 1996, at 5.
See generally Aphrodite Thevos Tsairis, Lessons
of Lockerbie, 22 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 31
(1996).
48. Boisseau, supra note 49, at 5.
49. Id.
50. Garry Wills, Road to Airline Safety Must be Paved at Our
Expense, Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 5, 1996, at 33.
51. Clinton Pushes Airport Security, The Baltimore Sun,
Sept. 10, 1996, at A1; see also Technology to
make Airlines Safer Will Carry a High Price Tag, The Omaha
World-Herald, Sept. 3, 1996, at 8.
52. Jenkins, supra note 27, at 61.
53. John Tucker, Micron Joins Terrorism Fight, The Idaho
Statesman, Aug. 3, 1996, at B1.
54. Id. "The company has entered a cooperative research
and development with the federal Aviation Administration to develop
a system to match passengers to their bags." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Tucker, supra note 55, at B1.
58. Id.
59. Clinton Pushes Airport Security, supra note
53, at A1.
60. Id.
61. See infra part IV.A.3.
62. Manning, supra note 36, at 529.
63. Boisseau, supra note 49, at A1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. As discussed in part II.B, supra. Airline travel may
be a somewhat inelastic market, that is, a certain amount of travelers
will continue flying despite nearly any cost. However, many passengers
will choose to take alternative forms of transportation or not
travel at all should airlines prices, in money or time, increase.
69. U.S. Const. amend IV.
70. See supra Part II.B.1. Any law and economics
analysis would be incomplete without stating the theory that the
free market could solve the problem without interference by the
government. If consumers were given a choice as to which airlines
had implemented which security measures (and airlines were free
to implement whatever measures they saw proper) the consumer could
choose to purchase the amount and type of security his risk aversion
allowed. This would not appear to be a case in which government
interference is warranted. Posner, supra note 4,
at 519.
71. Note here the risk to a terrorist of contacting a presumably
unknown airline employee. The terrorist must place a value on
the role of the employee and compare the cost spent in recruitment.
Only if the value is higher than the cost will the terrorist consider
contacting the employee. Of course, the cost must also factor
in the possibility of the employee turning the terrorist over
to law enforcement.
72. The costs of actually doing the search will have to be borne
by somebody. Airlines may search individually, have the government
search for them, or search under some collective grouping. Posner,
supra note 4, at 109:
Although information once obtained may be cheap to
convey to another person, it is often not cheap to
obtain; and if we do not allow people to profit from information
by keeping it to themselves, they will have
less or no incentive to obtain it in the first place,
and society will be the loser.
Id.
73. See part II.B, supra (discussing the effects
of government interference in the marketplace).
74. Of course, any employee who fails to pass the security clearance
will be in a worse position.
75. However, if the wage differential grows too large, more applicants
will enter the employee pool, driving down wages as the supply
of workers (and presumably those who would pass the background
checks) increases.
76. The labor pool is not fixed in size on the macroeconomic level,
meaning that all workers could decide to enter the airline industry,
if the benefits were sufficiently raised.
77. See supra part III.B.2.
78. Roberto Suro, U.S. Government to Assume Primary Responsibility
for Airport Security, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1996, at
A03. "The flying public would most directly be affected by
a plan that would prohibit any domestic flight from taking off
if a passenger checks a bag and then fails to board the airplane."
Id.
79. Around 1.5 million passengers board flights at American airports
each day. William S. Cohen, Known Danger Zones, Wash.
Post, Aug. 15, 1996, at A19.
80. However, this may result in friction among the airlines as
many flights connect with each other, and the airlines must transfer
luggage. If a bag with a missing passenger passed from an airline
which does not screen to an airline which screens, the latter
airline would have to delay its flight, so the passengers on the
latter flight would not realize that the first airline was making
them wait. This is a problem of accountability, or hidden costs
in the system.
81. Suro, supra note 80, at A03. Such rules are already
in place for international flights and have produced longer check-in
times and delays. Id.
82. Posner, supra note 4, at 368 describes the law
and economic approach to negligence using Hand's formula:
If the injury that the activity inflicts on each
victim is too small to make a lawsuit a paying
proposition, there is an argument for direct
regulation, provided the total injury inflicted by the activity
is substantial in relation to the cost of prevention.
Id.
In the instant case, consumer damages may be the costs of delays
(cost of time) or the cost of not having matching when an explosion
results. Because the potential for liability is larger (though
much rarer) in the latter situation, airlines would move to screen
all bags in the absence of regulation exempting them from liability
for not screening bags. The Hand Formula dictates that negligence
occurs when PL>B and P is probability
of the injury occurring, L is damage from the injury, and
B is the cost of the preventive measure. Id. Airlines
would not be negligent for not screening bags when the costs of
screening exceeds the cost of the incident multiplied by the probability
of an incident
83. In an industry poll, 80% of National Business Travel Association
members were "concerned about the current levels of airport
and airways security." Tom Beldon, How Much Will You Pay
for Safer Air Travel?, Phil. Inquirer, Aug. 19, 1996,
at 14. However, only 10% stated their employees were postponing
international travel because of safety concerns. Id. In
other surveys conducted at the conference, "most" were
willing to pay higher prices and endure longer waits to insure
greater safety; but only 24% of respondents indicated that they
would be willing to wait for more than two hours for increased
security. Id. However, 75% of the respondents said their
company would travel less if costs rose more than 10% as a result
of higher airfares or security surcharges. Id.
84. The airlines would incur may costs including: the pay for
staff which must work longer hours, often in unproductive waiting;
the direct costs of the matching system; the opportunity costs
from having idle equipment; and the possible costs of delaying
connecting flights.
85. Suro, supra note 80 at A03. "Numerous legal issues
still need to be resolved, including thorny civil liberties questions
such as whether the airlines would be given access to information
from government computer systems like those containing criminal
data." Id.
86. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding
that reasonable suspicion may be required to stop suspected drug
couriers);
See also Elise Bjorkan Clare, et al., Warrantless
Searches and Seizures, 84 Geo. L.J. 743 (1996).
87. Suro, supra note 80, at A03. As part of the plan, government
agencies are to help develop a sophisticated database which will
scrutinize all passengers to determine which passengers' baggage
should be examined by bomb detection equipment. Id. No
figures are available as to the proposed cost or feasibility of
such a measure.
88. Posner, supra note 4, at 682. Ideally, police
should not conduct searches when their social cost exceeds their
social benefit. Under the Hand Formula, a search is reasonable
if the cost of the search in impaired privacy (B) is less than
the probability that without the search the criminal will be able
to commit his act (P) multiplied by the social cost of allowing
the act to occur (L). Id. As the search becomes more intrusive,
the stakes of the crime must grow greater to justify the social
cost of the search. Id.
89. See, U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (Marshall,
J. dissenting). The names, addresses, phone numbers, travel histories,
and billing records of passengers would be run through a database
which might lead to a luggage search of those deemed suspicious.
Clinton Pushes Airline Safety, supra note 53, at
1A.
90. The President of Woodside Travel Trust, an alliance of 4,000
travel agencies said, "I think that some travelers may be
offended. However, it's prudent.... [i]f the cost of making the
sky safe is an intrusion of very low magnitude, that not too high
a price." Clinton Pushes Airline Safety, supra
note 53, at 1A.
91. Posner, supra note 4, at 658. The minority pays
through cases in which a racially based profile system would have
stopped an attack. The direct cost to the minority would be to
any passengers on the plane; the indirect cost would be from the
prejudice which would not have happened had the attack been prevented.
92. Id. Although the airport security may be foregoing
the complete details for the groups in the profile who are not
terrorists, the opportunity cost may be lower than the information
cost that extensive sampling of the minority group might entail.
93. According to congressional estimates, installing bomb detection
systems in the nation's 75 busiest airports would cost $1.5 to
3 billion. Suro, supra note 80, at A03. Actual economic
costs to the nation must later include the value of time spent
waiting at the airport for the bags to clear.
94. Id.
95. Cohen, supra note 81, at A19. In the past two years,
the FAA opened 22 investigations of screener training involving
17 airlines; at least 18 of these cases included allegations of
falsified training records. Id.
96. Id.
97. Other nations, including Israel, assign government employees
to the screening stations and rotate their assignments so that
one employee does not only view machine video during his working
day. Willis, supra note 52, at 33.
98. See Tsairis, supra note 49. Tsairis notes that
the airport systems used for detection of explosives today are
dependent on operator ability, but the Secret Service has been
willing to train its agents on advanced devices that call for
greater expertise, but less manual supervision. Id. at
36.
99. This is the classic supply and demand curve, as discussed
in part II, supra. The increased costs for security may
result in essentially a new product, as more people desire safety.
Thus, the increased training could conceivably not result in decreased
demand, but this is rather unlikely, since most passengers will
not notice any difference in training or pay for airline security
personnel.
100. Suro, supra note 80, at A03.
101. Wayne Eastman, "Everything's Up for Grabs":
The Coasean Theory in Game-theoretic Terms, 31 New Eng.
L. Rev., 1996. Eastman refers to the uncertainty between two
players in a zero-sum game.
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